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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S SHALLOW
ANALYSIS OF CONSOLIDATED
TAXATION INVALIDATES THE Loss
DISALLOWANCE RULE-RITE AID
CORP. V. UNITED STATES
Christopher R. Egan*
N a recent holding that could cost the United States Treasury $10
billion in revenue,1 the Federal Circuit invalidated the long-criticized 2
loss disallowance rule in Treasury Regulation Section 1.1502-20. This
rule limits the loss that consolidated corporate parents can recognize
from the sale of their subsidiary stock. Critics argue that the loss disal-
lowance rule is invalid because it creates a new tax without Congressional
approval. The Federal Circuit recently agreed in Rite Aid Corp. v. United
States.3 The Federal Circuit held that the loss disallowance rule is "mani-
festly contrary" to I.R.C. Section 1502, so Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite
Aid") did not have to follow it.4 The following demonstrates that the
Federal Circuit's analysis ignores the built-in gain problem that the loss
disallowance rule was implemented to solve, and it ignores the inherent
nature of consolidated taxation.
Rite Aid Corp. v. United States revolved around Rite Aid's sale of its
consolidated subsidiary Penn Encore ("Encore"). In 1984 and 1988, Rite
Aid purchased all of Encore's stock for $4,659,730.5 After this purchase,
Encore was only marginally profitable, and in the final three years before
1994, Encore's net income decreased from a $1.7 million profit to a $5.2
million loss. 6 Because of this loss, Rite Aid decided to sell Encore in
1994 to an unrelated company named CMI Holding Corporation
("CMI") for $18,000,000 in cash and additional CMI stock warrants.7
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1. John D. Mckinnon, Nominee for IRS Legal Job Wins Ruling That May Hurt Tax-
Shelter Crackdown, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at A10.
2. See Michael L. Schler, The Loss Disallowance Rule and Abusive Transactions, 46
TAx NoTEs 1462 (1990); Elliot Pisem & David E. Kahen, Rite Aid: Consolidated Return
Loss Disallowance Held Invalid, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 2001, at 5.
3. 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Rite Aid Corp. 1].
4. Id. at 1360.





Rite Aid wanted to treat the sale as an I.R.C. Section 338(h)(10) asset
sale, but it agreed to a stock sale after CMI insisted.8 At the time of sale,
Rite Aid's basis in Encore stock had increased to $38,644,400 because
Rite Aid had contributed $44,890,476 to Encore's capital, and Encore had
accumulated $10,905,806 in negative earnings and profits.9 In accordance
with I.R.C. Section 1001, Rite Aid subtracted this basis from the selling
price and calculated a $22,136,739 loss. 10
The controversy arose because Treasury Regulation Section 1.1502-
20(c) disallows this entire loss. The loss disallowance rule in Treasury
Regulation Section 1.1502-20(c) prohibits consolidated corporations from
recognizing loss on the sale of their subsidiary stock to the extent of a
duplicative loss factor.1' For this case's purposes, the duplicative loss fac-
tor equals the subsidiary's adjusted basis in its assets minus the fair mar-
ket value of the subsidiary's stock at the time of sale. 12 Encore's factor
equaled $28,535,858, so all of Rite Aid's $22,136,739 loss was
disallowed. 13
Rite Aid paid its 1994 tax without recognizing the Encore loss and then
filed a claim for refund. The Internal Revenue Service denied this claim,
so Rite Aid filed a complaint with the United States Court of Federal
Claims. The Court of Federal Claims granted the government's motion
for summary judgment,' 4 and Rite Aid appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered one issue-whether Trea-
sury Regulation Section 1.1502-20 validly implements the legislative au-
thority granted in I.R.C. Section 1502.15 Section 1502 grants the
Secretary of the Treasury the authority to "prescribe such regula-
tions... in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corpora-
tions making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the
group. . .may be [determined] in such manner as clearly to reflect the
income-tax liability... and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liabil-
ity.' 6 Rite Aid argued that the loss disallowance rule in Treasury Regu-
lation Section 1.1502-20 oversteps Section1502 because, instead of
helping measure an already existing tax, the loss disallowance rule creates
a new tax. 17
The Federal Circuit agreed with Rite Aid and invalidated the loss disal-




11. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 (1991).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c) (1991); Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. C1.
500, 503 (2000) [hereinafter Rite Aid Corp. I]. The Federal Circuit may have misunder-
stood this calculation; see its description at page 1358. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1358.
13. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1358.
14. Rite Aid Corp. It, 46 Fed. CI. 500 (2000).
15. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1358.
16. I.R.C. § 1502 (2001).
17. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
18. Id. at 1360.
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thorize the Secretary to choose a method that imposes a tax on income
that would not otherwise be taxed." 19 The loss disallowance rule imposes
this new tax, stated the court, because it unilaterally excepts I.R.C. Sec-
tion 165.20 Section 165 generally allows a parent corporation to deduct
losses from the sale of subsidiary stock.21 But the loss disallowance rule,
concluded the court, excepts Section 165 by taking these losses away from
parents that file consolidated returns.22 According to the court, this loss
restriction might be valid if filing consolidated returns caused these
losses, but these losses occur "regardless of whether corporations file sep-
arate or consolidated returns. '2 3 Because I.R.C. Section 1502 allows the
Treasury to address only problems that arise from consolidated taxation,
the court concluded that the loss disallowance rule oversteps the author-
ity granted in Section 1502.24
Before analyzing the court's argument, one must recognize the power
of legislative regulations like the loss disallowance rule. Because these
regulations implement legislative delegations of power, the Supreme
Court grants them "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute [granting power]. '2 5 This test
creates a high burden that the Federal Circuit's analysis does not
overcome.
Treasury implemented the loss disallowance rule to solve a consoli-
dated taxation problem that allows parent corporations to sell subsidiary
built-in gain assets-assets with a higher fair market value than adjusted
basis-without recognizing gain. For example,2 6 suppose parent corpora-
tion P purchased the stock of subsidiary corporation S for $400 and
elected to file a consolidated return with S. S has two assets with $100 of
built-in gain each: Asset #1 with a $100 basis and a $200 market value,
and Asset #2 with a $100 basis and a $200 market value. If S sells Asset
#1, P's consolidated group would recognize $100 of gain. In addition,
Treasury Regulation Section 1.1502-32 allows P to increase its basis in S
stock by $100 to a total basis of $500. Regulations allow this increase in
stock basis, "so that income or loss previously included in a group's con-
solidated taxable income is not reflected a second time on the sale of a
subsidiary's stock."' 27 But in the above situation, where S's income re-
lates to built-in gain, this basis increase allows P's consolidated group to
permanently avoid all taxation on the Asset #1 sale. For example, if P
19. Id. at 1359 (quoting Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 261 (1979)).
20. Id. at 1360.
21. I.R.C. § 165 (2001); Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
22. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
23. Id. at 1360.
24. Id. at 1360.
25. Id. at 1359 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)).
26. This example is based on example 2 in Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed.
Reg. 9426-01, 9427 (Temp. Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
27. I.R.S. Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445.
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now sells all of its S stock, it recognizes an artificially created $100 loss 28
that offsets the $100 gain that S recognized on the Asset #1 sale. This
result directly conflicts with I.R.C. Sections 336 and 337, which require
corporations to recognize gain when they distribute or sell corporate
property.29 To take advantage of this conflict, many taxpayers created
abusive tax-shelter schemes with labels like "son of mirror. '30
To solve this problem, Treasury considered many complicated solu-
tions.31 Theoretically, the most accurate solution is tracing. Tracing in-
volves tracking a subsidiary's built-in gain and not allowing the parent to
increase its subsidiary stock basis for any earnings or gain related to that
built-in gain. Built-in gain changes as an asset's value changes, so tracing
requires constant appraisal.32 These appraisals are not only incredibly
burdensome, they can be very imprecise and inconsistent. 33 Treasury
concluded that "[t]racing becomes more subjective the deeper you go
into it. ''34 Accordingly, tracing was rejected.
After considering other combinations of tracing and presumption, the
treasury decided on the loss disallowance rule. 35 The other options were
as administratively burdensome and imprecise as tracing. 36 Treasury ad-
mitted that the loss disallowance rule was imperfect because it not only
disallowed losses related to built-in gain, it disallowed economic losses.37
Rite Aid's loss, for example, related to Encore's decline in economic
value. Nevertheless, Treasury's other options, like tracing, had other
problems and burdens. In the end, Treasury chose the loss disallowance
rule because it saved the taxpayer and IRS resources, and it produced a
predicable result. 38
One may disagree with Treasury's decision, but mere disagreement
with a carefully-weighed solution to a complex problem should not over-
turn a legislative regulation. The Supreme Court has made it clear that if
28. $400 price minus $500 basis equals $100 loss.
29. See I.R.C. §§ 336-337 (2001). These code sections repealed Gen. Utils. & Operat-
ing Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
30. See BORIS I. BnTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 13.42(5)(c) (2001) for a detailed explanation of "son of mir-
ror" transactions.
31. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9428-9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990), for a detailed analysis of all of these solutions and their
drawbacks.




35. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9428-9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
36. Id.
37. At a Federal Bar Association meeting in 1990, IRS representatives admitted that
the disallowance of economic loss was the "rough cut" under the loss disallowance model.
Lee A. Sheppard, Government Defends Loss Disallowance Rules, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY
64-10 (1990). But IRS representatives reiterated that there are "different rough cuts under
other models." Id.
38. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01 (Temp. Reg. an-
nounced Mar. 14, 1990).
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a "choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned. 39
Congress has never objected to the loss disallowance rule since Treasury
implemented it in 1990.40 In fact, Congress considered legislation that
would repeal Rite Aid.41 Congress wanted Treasury to make hard, com-
plex decisions that would further clear measurement of consolidated tax-
able income.42 In the Federal Circuit's perfect world, the loss
disallowance rule may not be the best decision. But in the real world,
every solution to the built-in gain problem presents disadvantages. Trea-
sury carefully chose the loss disallowance rule because it presents the
least disadvantages.
In addition to the Federal Circuit's failure to consider built-in gain
problems, the Federal Circuit ignored consolidated taxation's inherent
nature. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the loss disallowance rule cre-
ates tax because it forbids consolidated parents from deducting a loss that
I.R.C. Section 165 allows separate parents to deduct.43 This reasoning
"ignores the fact that the consolidated return regulations adopt a compre-
hensive approach to gain and loss duplication that represents a funda-
mental departure from separate return treatment. ' 44 Unlike separate
taxation, consolidated taxation treats Rite Aid and Encore as one corpo-
ration for taxation purposes. 45 Accordingly, the loss disallowance rule
furthers the clear-measurement purpose of I.R.C. Section 1502 by prohib-
iting that one corporation from recognizing the same loss twice-once
when Rite Aid sells Encore and once when Encore later sells its assets. 46
I.R.C. Section 165 allows both a separate parent and separate subsidiary
to recognize this loss, but Encore and Rite Aid were not treated as sepa-
rate corporations when this loss was created. In short, the Federal Circuit
is comparing apples to oranges when it compares consolidated treatment
to separate treatment.
If taken to its logical conclusion, the Federal Circuit's apples-to-or-
anges comparison would invalidate many consolidated regulations that
39. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
40. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9428-9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
41. See Kenneth J. Kies, Kies Opposes Overturning Rite Aid, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY
169-23 (2001). Granted, "the view of a later Congress cannot control the interpretation of
an earlier enacted statute." O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90 (1996). But it does
give insight into what a prior Congress might have intended.
42. See I.R.C. § 1502 (2001).
43. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
44. Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9429 (Temp. Reg. an-
nounced Mar. 14, 1990).
45. Textron Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 7 (2001) ("'The basic concept underlying *
• * [the consolidated return] provisions is that the consolidated group is * * * a single
taxable enterprise ... ' (quoting 3 BITIKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS, par. 90.5 at 90-48 (2d ed. 1991))).
46. Rite Aid Corp. 11, 46 Fed. Cl. at 506.
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benefit consolidated parents. For example, Treasury Regulation Section
1.1502-32 allows a consolidated parent to increase its subsidiary stock ba-
sis when its subsidiary recognizes income.47 This increase prevents the
consolidated group from recognizing the subsidiary's income a second
time upon sale of the subsidiary stock. Separately filing parents, how-
ever, may not increase their subsidiary stock basis, so the separate parent
must recognize the subsidiary income a second time. Under the Federal
Circuit's rational, the basis increase in Treasury Regulation Section
1.1502-32 is invalid because it "addresses a situation that arises from the
sale of stock regardless of whether corporations file separate or consoli-
dated returns. '48
The Federal Circuit also did not consider Rite Aid's consent. I.R.C.
Section 1501 clearly states that consolidated treatment is a privilege that
corporations may take advantage of only if they "consent to all the con-
solidated return regulations prescribed under section 1502. . .. ,,49 There-
fore, Rite Aid consented to the loss disallowance rule when it decided to
file a consolidated return. Rite Aid obviously decided that consolidated
taxation's advantages outweighed its disadvantages, but then wanted to
back out of the deal it made with the government. As the government
stated in its Federal Circuit brief, Rite Aid agreed to all of the consoli-
dated return regulations and "must take the bitter with the sweet."'50
A final interesting point involves Rite Aid's attorney, B. John Williams.
Before the Rite Aid decision, President Bush nominated Mr. Williams as
IRS Chief Counsel.51 This coincidence highlights concerns that the Bush
administration will not fight corporate tax shelters as aggressively as the
Clinton Administration. 52 But Treasury officials vigorously deny this crit-
icism, stating that they are "working with the IRS to identify all abusive
transactions and will close them down immediately. '53
Despite Treasury's position against tax shelters, the IRS has decided
not to appeal Rite Aid. Instead, it announced in Notice 2002-11 that it
plans to implement new regulations governing loss disallowance on sales
of consolidated subsidiary stock.54 Until those new regulations are imple-
mented, consolidated groups should use Treasury Regulation Section
1.337(d)-2 to determine the allowable loss from a sale of their subsidiary
stock.55
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 (1991).
48. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
49. I.R.C. § 1501 (2001).
50. Rite Aid Corp. 1, 255 F.3d at 1360.
51. John D. McKinnon, Nominee for IRS Legal Job Wins Ruling That May Hurt Tax-
Shelter Crackdown, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at A10.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Treasury spokeswoman Tara Bradshaw).
54. I.R.S. Notice 2002-11, 2002-7 I.R.B. 526.
55. Id.
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